That may seem a little extreme to say, but also not extreme enough. Marco Rubio will be visiting Slovakia and Hungary, two European countries that have embraced the far right and are vaguely pro-Putin. Like most authoritarian countries, they have relatively small economies and are performing well below their democratic peers. From the president on down, the message is clear. They want a more divided, more authoritarian, more corrupt Europe. A Europe in their own self image.

This is both a good and a bad thing for Europeans. The fact the Germans were all but disbanding their military less than a decade ago was a stupid idea. A short sighted one based on a false understanding that ties with Russia brings security and cooperation. In 1985, as the US and Europe faced off against the threat of Warsaw Pact forces pushing West across Germany, military readiness was a real concern. The US beefed up its nuclear capabilities using a combination of cruise and intermediate range missiles to blunt what they believed would be an unstoppable roll of red armor. A mere twenty years later, a reunited Germany faced social problems and a Russia more concerned with separatist regions, like Chechnya. The war in Europe was over, as most people believed.

A few years later and people saw a Russia that appeared to have significant, advanced military capabilities. Prior to the invasion of Ukraine, some speculated that Russia’s ability to wage war meant they could drive to the Pyrenees mountains before they could be stopped. With the US presence there as a last resort, the Germans (especially) tried to ensure peace through diplomacy. If Russia sells gas to Europe, it should be invested in a stable and prosperous Europe. It’s much cheaper than trying to counter so mighty a military. But, as was seen in Ukraine, the entire Russian military structure was rotten on the inside. And the Russian army in the 2020s was still driving meat assaults behind artillery, as it had for over a hundred years. Whatever was left after the artillery finished would be murdered or raped by untrained troops that were rioters as much as they were soldiers. They could only get to the Pyrenees if they stole spare parts, gas, phones, televisions, food, equipment, and medicine along the way.

The Europeans have a choice. Do they stay in the American orbit, which is becoming increasingly inhospitable, or do they strike off on their own? If they stay with the US they have to deal with attacks from both Russia and the US on their economic and political union with the express intention to weaken it. Like they did with Russia, they could try to dance diplomatically, trying to spin away the truth. Or they can have a look in the mirror and realize that they are better off in a union, Russia is their immediate threat, and America is on the way to becoming a threat.

Europe doesn’t have to defeat China. They barely have a dog in that fight, except the UK’s sense of solidarity or loyalty with Australia and New Zealand. Nor do they really have to secure the Pacific trade routes, although goods from South Korea and Japan are nice. India and Africa can be low-cost manufacturing hubs for Europe and those are much easier routes to secure. Technology, electrification, and reduced dependence on fossil fuels are in Europe’s interests, along with securing energy arrangements with Africa and the Middle East. Europe doesn’t need eleven nuclear aircraft carriers to deal with Russia. Nor do they need to land forces anywhere in the world within a few hours of getting the word. They need to deal with one threat that has a fraction of their population and a pathetic economy. If Russia did not have nuclear weapons, it wouldn’t be considered a major power.

What most people don’t understand is when you buy a weapon, like a missile or a plane, it needs constant servicing and updates. A missile might need software updates to deal with new counter-measures. The F-35 needs software updates for each mission. It is impossible for any EU country to maintain their F-35s without support from US contractors, manufacturers, and the US government that controls them. What if Russia invades Estonia and the US decides they don’t want to get involved, so they say Europe can’t use the F-35 to fight Russia? It’s not likely, but it’s possible. In part because Russia may not directly attack Estonia, but rather foment insurrection among a portion of the Russian speaking minority and send in “little green men.” Would Trump just say “it’s an internal Estonian matter” and refuse to abide by Article 5? And would certainly not extend the nuclear umbrella to cover an “internal matter.”

If Europeans are hoping other pro-NATO Republicans would step in and stop any serious break in the relationship, they are taking a gamble that hasn’t paid off so far. When confronted about Trump, the first thing the Republicans do is ask to see the proof, as “they haven’t read it.” When you show them the proof of statements made by senior officials and policy documents, they say it’s not serious and look at what the administration does. When you point to actions by the administration, they find some other excuse. That frog has been boiled. It is now Trump soup. And even if the mid-term elections sweep in majorities of Democrats in the House and Senate, there is no guarantee they are going to be worried about Europe. In fact, some of those who get elected will have a “not our problem” approach to foreign policy. Because their electorate doesn’t view it as their problem.

The only real choice is to develop home-grown infrastructure and capabilities they can rely on without participation by the United States. Look at this period as a chance at a transition. The alliance allows countries to specialize, and the US provided a lot of the intelligence, communications, and control infrastructure. And, most importantly, a nuclear umbrella. Europe is going to have to mitigate its loss by developing their own capabilities. This means pushing a European satellite launch program and reusable rocket program (to keep costs manageable). It’s going to mean more nuclear weapons and delivery systems. It’s going to mean replacing US infrastructure, knowing that it could be denied to them, or worse, weaponized against them. It will also mean conducting more aggressive and intelligence and influence operations to help shape US opinion and deal with Russian and US disinformation.

On its best days, Europe is like a super-tanker. It’s slow to turn, but once it has a direction it’s impossible to stop. On it’s worst days, it’s a super-tanker with a stuck rudder. But it has some advantages that the US does not. In Ukraine it has a modern warfare laboratory to develop new weapons and tactics. To take a look at the NATO standard tactics that aren’t working and refine those tactics. It’s a chance to develop weapons for what future combat might look like, and to counter newer Russian weapons. Maybe it’s a dark forest of lurking drones and anti-drones. It also allows space for home-grown replacements to US systems to be vetted and refined. It’s horrible to think of Ukraine as a testing ground, but Ukraine needs more weapons and they need more imaginative to counter the ones Russia is firing at them. And Europe needs to quickly build capabilities.

What I don’t think a lot of Americans appreciate is that US companies they invest in, have in their 401(k), and work for, sell to Europe. Europe won’t just be replacing a few F-35s. It will be replacing Master Card and Visa as payment processors. It will need to replace Meta, X, and YouTube for for social networks. And it will need to replace Amazon, Microsoft, and Google as infrastructure providers. It will need an independent industry to provide semi-conductors and equipment so that a mercurial President can’t suddenly demand those exports are halted. (And a lick-spittle congress does nothing). It will mean moving away from US dollars as a reserve, thereby driving down the US dollar long-term. The US has been the incredible beneficiary of a close alliance with Europe, but they took the benefits for granted.