inflation

The Dollar’s Tight-Rope

The dollar is the most often used thing of value in which non-USA countries store their foreign currency reserve. First off, what’s a foreign currency reserve? These are often large sums of currency held by the central banks of various countries to stabilize their currencies. If there’s a sudden shock on the Swiss Franc, the government of Switzerland can buy or sell dollars to mitigate the shock. In some cases, the governments also use reserves to facilitate trade or government purchases. This was traditionally done with gold and silver. However, since 1974, it has largely been done with dollars. Dollars provided by a country that (until recently) was committed to international rules and institutions that facilitated trade and rule of law for disputes.

The dollar is not only a reserve, held by many countries including China and Russia, but also a preferred currency for many international exchanges. When you buy a barrel of oil, that contract is denominated in dollars. (Even though the Saudis did poke Joe Biden in the eye by executing some contracts with China in Yuan – it was a political move, not based economics). If a large bank, or a government, lends money to another country, it will generally do so in dollars. A German bank does not want useless Bolivars, Dinars, Pesos, Drachmas, or Rials. They want dollars, Euros, and Swiss Francs (probably in that order). The country or government receiving the loan also wants dollars. (Although Euros can be fine, as they translate quickly and easily into dollars).

This puts the United States in a unique position, as the world’s supplier of dollars. When we run a deficit, we borrow that money in dollars. If a German bank buys a US treasury bond (a loan to the United States government), it will be repaid in dollars. The repayment risk to the German bank is minimal, as the US can just print all the dollars it wants. The risk to the German bank is the US will be poorly managed, and the value of the dollar will be inflated away. Let’s say the German bank buys the treasury bond for $1,000, expecting to receive $50 in interest every year for the next five years and then the $1,000 principle. At a 2% inflation rate, that $1,000 will be worth about $900 in today’s money. But if the US engages in some very stupid decisions, and the inflation rate climes to 5%, that will be worth $775 in today’s money. Until recently, the US has had largely very sober, responsible economic managers, so the risk was minimal.

How bad can inflation get? We’ve had 5% inflation for short periods at numerous times. It didn’t really bother people that much, because it quickly fell back down. We had around 9% under Biden for a brief period and people lost their minds. But many places have seen inflation rates in the 20% or more range for prolonged periods of time. They still survived as countries. Even hyper-inflated countries have held together. At a 20% inflation rate, the German bank would see $325 returned in today’s money. If that bank had any real fear the US was going to 20% inflation, they’d avoid the bond until it had over a 20% interest rate. But most US debt is actually held by US individuals.

On net, this is a good position. If we want to buy something we make the magic tokens most people want to exchange. If we need more dollars, we can make more. We don’t even have to print them. We just put some numbers in a database. People are also willing to buy our debt, which we will pay back in those same magic tokens we make. Unless we do something stupid, that results in protracted, high inflation, we will continue to hold this unique position. The contenders for this rare status are the Euro and the Yen. No one wants Yuan or other BRICs currencies, not even the BRICS countries. Many countries hold a basket of currencies that include Yen, Euros, Swiss Francs, gold, and silver, but the US dollar is the workhorse currency.

There have been a couple of recent incidents, however, that may interfere with the dollar status. The first is seizing reserves. Specifically, a federal court seizing Argentine dollar reserves held in the US to pay creditors. For any country relying on the auspices of the Federal Reserve to hold their reserves (which many countries do), the chance they are seized by a US court has to be taken into consideration. (The US also holds the gold reserves of other countries as well). Unless you want to have palettes of $100 bills in a warehouse, you may want to hold bearer bonds, gold, and silver in your own country. Along with this was partially pushing Russia out of the financial system for the invasion of Ukraine. Although this was something I felt was necessary at the time, with the recent administration, European countries especially might be concerned. Could UK assets be seized if the UK does something that insults the orange idiot? Before now it was assumed that it would require a lot of legal mumbo-jumbo – but with the administration operating outside the law, it becomes a matter of fiat by the generalismo.

What would the world do? I really don’t know. The idea of crypto currencies stepping into this role is ridiculous. The volatility of any crypto makes holding it as a reserve nearly suicidal. Likewise, gold seems unable to handle the requirements of a much larger trading system than pre-1974 trade. It would also be a boon to the Russians, something many Europeans would rather avoid. However, as we’ve seen, gold has been been climbing steadily over the last year. And it’s hard to detach the timing from the chaotic nature of US policy. The Euro and the Yen are not there yet in peoples’ minds. The Yen may be closer to that role than the Euro, which seems too susceptible to political meddling from Europe. (Which should be a warning to the dollar).

What would happen to the US if the dollar no longer occupied its current position? I think it matters how we get there. If we get there because of an orderly move to more balanced baskets of reserves, not much. But, if we get there because of dollar weaponization or severe inflation, that’s a different story. For one thing, we would be paying higher interest rates on US debt. If it’s an inflation story, both US and foreign bond holders would want higher interest payments. Somewhat less if it’s a weaponization story, but they still would want compensation for added risk. The dollar would fall in value as people demand less dollars. As a country that imports quite a bit of stuff, this would push inflation.

But I suspect the biggest change would be the world no longer has to “grin and bear it,” when the US does something they don’t like. On one side is a fall into policies that degrade the value of holding dollars On the other side is a fall into the world of inflation. Maybe it isn’t a tight rope. Maybe it’s more like a balance beam, with more room for error than I believe. But at the end of the day, the loss of the dollar’s special position would not make America great again.

The Quantum Job Market

We have 3 numbers in fairly short order: JOLTS, first time claims, and the monthly jobs number. What do we have so far? The first time claims continue to come in well below ‘recession’ levels. From that number, the labor market looks tight. The JOLTS data, covered earlier, indicates a functioning labor market and not a great disconnect between people leaving jobs and people getting hired. And today we have the non-farm payrolls number. Let’s also add in the ADP number (which I do not think is as reliable as the payroll data). Both the payroll and the ADP number show a struggling labor market, according to historical metrics. Not a bad labor market, but a struggling labor market. Like most economic statistics, we care more about trends than the absolute number, but a non-farm payroll number indicative of a very healthy labor market would be above 150,000. Although it’s possible to get the occasional blip below 100,000.

Note the left hand side is the crazy period when the job market went nuts after COVID.

So far we’ve had about 160,000 jobs created over the last six months. That’s well below the number we need to absorb new entrants into the economy. The less reliable ADP number confirms the payroll data. The JOLTS data indicates a reasonable labor market and the first time climes show little job loss. This is where I think the first time claims may be under-reporting. If you lose your job, you might make slightly more money driving an Uber than collecting unemployment. I suspect other factors are depressing the actual number of people who would seek unemployment assistance. That’s not necessarily a bad thing, if you can make more money driving an Uber than collecting unemployment. You would be better off, even if you are grossly under-employed.

The red line represents initial unemployment claims, while the blue line is a survey of people looking for full time work.

This is why there is no magic single number, and no magic single sample of that number, that gives you a picture of the US economy. From the numbers, the labor market looks slack but not recessionary. It seems to back up the anecdotes of job hugging (where employers and employees may want to part ways but decide it’s better not to part ways right now), and new entrants having a difficult time finding a job. If it’s true that 70 million Americans engage in some kind of “gig” work, that’s nearly half the labor force (about 160 million participants). And maybe a weak jobs number isn’t as bad as it sounds if people can enter the gig economy instead of a “regular” job, and those people are under-counted. (Setting aside issues of job security, benefits, and the impact of under-employment). Is the labor market indicating recession?

There is something we need to acknowledge. Deficit spending is stimulative. At the end of the 2008 recession, there was a push-back on yet another democrat taxing and spending. And the stimulative policies were tempered by the resistance from republicans. (Although at levels that now seem quaint). That drew out the recovery period because fiscal policy was not injected into the problem. Spending more money than the amount removed through taxation stimulates activity and we may have ratcheted that up with the latest budget. We won’t know the final numbers until 2027. It will depend on actual receipts and actual outlays. There is some evidence the outlays will be higher than anticipated, with the DOGE effort showing an actual increase in government spending. If income tax receipts are weaker than offsets from tariffs, it could easily come in above estimates.

The current CBO estimates put the 2026 estimated deficit at 5.5% of GDP. The percentage of GDP is useful because it allows us to gauge what the real impact of the deficit, given the size of the economy. After all, a billion dollar deficit is a much bigger issue if the economy is only 10 billion dollars in size. The 2026 number may be above (likely) or below (unlikely) estimates given factors we won’t know until later. We won’t know until we actually see the impact of the new tax law, along with actual real spending.

The deficit coming down slows the economy in kind of a natural way, as activity boosts tax revenues and broader employment lowers spending on programs like SNAP and unemployment insurance. This natural brake pulls money out of the economy in higher tax revenues and lower spending, reducing the risk of the expansion becoming inflationary. However, we are doing two things that are expansionary for 2026, which are reducing tax rates and pushing the Fed to lower rates. In the face of already expansionary fiscal policy, this may push inflation for 2026. Unfortunately, it’s almost impossible to know the actual impact on inflation because we don’t know how the economy will react. The consumer in the lower 50% of income is in shambles. Most of the consumption is done by the top 20%, with half concentrated in the top 10%. There may not be the purchasing power for broad inflation, even if high end goods may see a level of inflation.

In addition, lower imports from tariffs boosts GDP, even if it means people are consuming less stuff. Could we be in a world where stagnation is masked as the GDP “increases” due to fewer imports? It’s mathematically possible. You could have patchy inflation depending on what goods you are measuring along with an improving GDP due to fewer imports. (You aren’t better off, you just don’t buy that sweater or bottle of wine, because it’s a little pricey). Combine this with jobs numbers being a less reliable measure of economic health (because workers don’t leverage unemployment insurance and transition to gig work), and you could have a stagnant economy, even if the numbers don’t look bad. You have low unemployment because of gig work and GDP growth from lower imports, even though you are under employed and just can’t afford things you used to buy.

Note that numbers are negative, so sloping up and right means the lower imports.

At the end of the day, the purpose of economics is to understand how these voluntary and sometimes emergent systems of interaction between people create well-being. The purpose of 2% inflation or a target of 4.5% unemployment isn’t because the number is important, but because the well-being of many people seems to change at around those inflection points. If inflation drops below 2%, that is usually because economic activity is slowing and over time we will be worse off. If it goes above 2%, that’s a level people feel it erodes their buying power and they are less well off. If unemployment is too low, there is inflation as wages are bid up, while if it is too high, people are out of work and can’t find jobs. The goal of the specific metric should be to indicate when a change in policy is necessary because people feel their well-being is falling.

But it feels like we’re too focused on the numbers, rather than what they mean. I can’t count how many times it feels like the number itself is the target or the policy is being gamed to meet the target number. This includes “patching up” numbers like the CPI so they under report inflation. (There is mixed evidence on this. But we would expect the CPI goods basket to change as the basket of goods and services from 1976 is less applicable in 2026). When the economy changes, the old metrics used to gauge the health of the economy no longer make sense. Following unemployment claims or number of jobs created, if people are shifting to gig work that isn’t reported through these numbers, may no longer provide a meaningful metric. And yet, we don’t have a widely accepted substitute. Like a quantum system isn’t in one state or another until it’s observed, our economy is both good and bad at the same time, because we lack the metrics to observe it.

It Feels a Little Like a Lie

As Q3 GDP arrives, it’s above expectations. I hate anecdotal accounts as a basis for inferring trends, but we have had report after report of worsening conditions for individuals. Whether it’s visits to food banks or layoffs, or retailers pointing to weaker consumers, it feels like Q3 GDP should not have come in at 4.3%. I’m certainly not saying anything ridiculous, like the number is a fabrication or it should have been something negative. I live in the real world (or at lest do my best to discern the real world around me). Somewhere in the 3.5 to 2.5% range felt reasonable.

I’m still digging through the explanations, but one thing that sticks in the back of my mind is feeling like a 4 year economics degree was a joke. All the discussions about stability, or rule of law, or predictability as good soil for economic growth, are out the window. Apparently, you can run the economy like a drunken loon and it doesn’t matter. Or the government stepping in to buy stakes in companies is now a good thing (remember when the evil government stepped in to buy a stake in the big three)? Nosebleed deficits are now okay. Absolutely bonkers ideas from those responsible for our economy, like replacing income taxes with tariffs, is now calmly, if not happily, digested by the markets.

But the biggest shock is the degree to which tariffs don’t matter. It’s part of a larger narrative, where the lower income folks that make the stuff get the shaft and higher income investors and managers are doing better and better. (The managers and shareholders do well as profits, bonuses, and stock awards roll in for moving production overseas, while local workers lose their jobs. While the remuneration is tax efficient, at lower rates for capital gains, the unemployed eventually see their benefits cut because they’re ‘lazy’). We make life better and easier for the top earners while fucking the bottom quartile half three-quarters. Any discussion of taking the surplus from trade and using it to offset the negative impact as jobs shift overseas or are eliminated entirely is sidelined as socialism.

But I digress. We have had chaotic, possibly illegal, and arbitrary tariffs and restraints of trade (like who the fuck thought the government should get a ‘cut’ of GPU sales). And it doesn’t matter. Push for inflationary rate cuts. It doesn’t matter. Heck, I could be wrong, we might not get inflation. Make enforcement a function of bribes to a would-be monarch. No problem, apparently rule of law was not important as long as a bribe gets you what you want. Need to merge? Don’t look for clear guidance to support M&A, just give the grifter in chief and his cronies their vig. Policy clarity can be defined as knowing where and who to bribe.

Am I angry that GDP came in at 4.3%? It surprised me, but I’m not angry. I am frustrated that all the talk about the care and feeding of the economy, the hard choices we need to make to keep it running well, or the degree to which we need the best people running seems like a joke. All the ivy league, PhD, novella-sized CV people apparently were just tooting their own class horns. You took an economics at a community college and think we should return to the gold standard? Who the fuck knows at this point, maybe it will work. You’re a welder who thinks we should stop importing things from Turkey to boost GDP? Sure, why not. Think there’s a trillion dollars of spending that can seriously be cut? Sure, no problem, fuck the math.

Admittedly, this was a rant. Maybe we’re floating on a bubble that may pop badly. And then we might see the effects of stupid policies through the lens of a spiraling economy. And we’ll rediscover we need intelligent, skill people in charge. Or maybe not. Maybe Baumol and Blinder is as much a work of careful fiction as a theology textbook.

But that’s not something I want for me, my family, or my neighbors. Maybe we’ll see the government wade further into business by back-stopping any collapse with “free money” of cheap interest rates, loan guarantees, and buying even more equity in private companies. I remember when that kind of socialism was something Republicans vehemently opposed. Against all the good principles of being careful stewards of the pillars that hold up prosperity. Manipulating rates, funny money deficits, state owned companies, and corrupt officials were something we pointed to as markers of guaranteed economic suffering under tin-pot dictators. I never could have imagined it would be our future.

There’s a Bad Smell

If you don’t think something is very wrong, you’re not looking very hard. Recently, the cost of the average new car in the US topped $50,000. The median household income in the US (meaning the half way point, if you arrange all peoples’ incomes from lowest to highest) was about $83,000. The mean was about $66,000, suggesting a lot of skew from a bunch of very high incomes at the top end of the data set. So the “average,” under some definition of average, American household would pay about 70% to 80% of their income for the average new car.

If we go back 30 years, to the mid 1980s, median income was about 24,000 in 1985. (Not adjusted for inflation). If you adjust it for inflation, we have to face the ugly fact that 40 years has only taken us from $64,000 of 1985 median household income in today’s dollars to $83,000. Meaning that with all the advancements we’ve seen, and all the gains in productivity, our earning power grew just 35% or so. That’s less than a 1% improvement per year. But in the 1980s, a nice Buick or Dodge set you back less than $10,000. You could get economy cars for $5,000 – $7,500 price range. The average new car set a family back less than 50% of its income. Less than a third, if the bought an economy car. Even if you adjust for inflation, the average new car should be in the $25,000 to $30,000 range. To get to that that “less than 50%” range in today’s actual prices., you need an income of at least $100,000, if not slightly more.

This is the difference between purchasing power, wealth, and income. Partly it’s inflation, and partly it’s not inflation (to the degree inflation measurements aren’t arbitrary). The price of an “average” new car has risen faster than inflation. So has housing. So has medical care. So has education. If you could easily afford an average car in 1985, but struggle to buy an average car in 2025, you are poorer as far as cars are concerned. If you could afford to go to the doctor’s office in 1985 but not 2025, you are poorer along that axis. However, an IBM PC computer or original Macintosh cost maybe 10% of your 1985 median household income. Today, that (relatively) high-end computer is in the 3-4% category. We’re much richer on that axis. The necessary stuff is more expensive, but escapism is cheap.

I would argue that the things that matter, like food, housing, and transportation are why we feel poorer today. Setting aside the paltry growth in inflation adjusted median household income (while upper incomes have grown much faster than inflation), having to put yourself in deep debt to do “normal” things hurts.

The fact we are drowning in televisions, computers, and other gadgets doesn’t compensate for not being able to afford college. If I were to ask most people struggling to buy a house, would you rather have: more expensive TVs and computers or cheaper houses? They would opt for the house. If I asked the person trying to get one more year out of the ride that gets them to their job, if they wanted cheaper cell phones or cheaper cars, they’d opt for cheaper cars. Or a public transportation system that didn’t feel punitive in its cost and inefficiency.

You need transportation, you need a house, you need to go to the doctor and the dentist. Those seem more and more like luxury items. That’s what feels so wrong about today. I caught a passing notice about Paul Krugman saying China has passed the US in purchasing power parity. They may have. I haven’t read it. I’m a little tired of Krugman, who lost credibility with me as an economist, for focusing on too many nakedly partisan issues. But we all feel it. If you make more money next year, it doesn’t really feel like you got ahead. In fact, it feels like you’re falling further and further behind.

So you tell me, after 40 years of progress, with companies worth trillions of dollars, and with two people in a race to be the first trillionaire, does it feel like we’ve advanced? Do you feel wealthier? Does that seem like a system that’s working for the benefit of most people? Do numbers like GDP and a soaring stock market paint a rosy picture, so we we learn to ignore what our lying eyes are trying to tell us?