That may seem a little extreme to say, but also not extreme enough. Marco Rubio will be visiting Slovakia and Hungary, two European countries that have embraced the far right and are vaguely pro-Putin. Like most authoritarian countries, they have relatively small economies and are performing well below their democratic peers. From the president on down, the message is clear. They want a more divided, more authoritarian, more corrupt Europe. A Europe in their own self image.

This is both a good and a bad thing for Europeans. The fact the Germans were all but disbanding their military less than a decade ago was a stupid idea. A short sighted one based on a false understanding that ties with Russia brings security and cooperation. In 1985, as the US and Europe faced off against the threat of Warsaw Pact forces pushing West across Germany, military readiness was a real concern. The US beefed up its nuclear capabilities using a combination of cruise and intermediate range missiles to blunt what they believed would be an unstoppable roll of red armor. A mere twenty years later, a reunited Germany faced social problems and a Russia more concerned with separatist regions, like Chechnya. The war in Europe was over, as most people believed.

A few years later and people saw a Russia that appeared to have significant, advanced military capabilities. Prior to the invasion of Ukraine, some speculated that Russia’s ability to wage war meant they could drive to the Pyrenees mountains before they could be stopped. With the US presence there as a last resort, the Germans (especially) tried to ensure peace through diplomacy. If Russia sells gas to Europe, it should be invested in a stable and prosperous Europe. It’s much cheaper than trying to counter so mighty a military. But, as was seen in Ukraine, the entire Russian military structure was rotten on the inside. And the Russian army in the 2020s was still driving meat assaults behind artillery, as it had for over a hundred years. Whatever was left after the artillery finished would be murdered or raped by untrained troops that were rioters as much as they were soldiers. They could only get to the Pyrenees if they stole spare parts, gas, phones, televisions, food, equipment, and medicine along the way.

The Europeans have a choice. Do they stay in the American orbit, which is becoming increasingly inhospitable, or do they strike off on their own? If they stay with the US they have to deal with attacks from both Russia and the US on their economic and political union with the express intention to weaken it. Like they did with Russia, they could try to dance diplomatically, trying to spin away the truth. Or they can have a look in the mirror and realize that they are better off in a union, Russia is their immediate threat, and America is on the way to becoming a threat.

Europe doesn’t have to defeat China. They barely have a dog in that fight, except the UK’s sense of solidarity or loyalty with Australia and New Zealand. Nor do they really have to secure the Pacific trade routes, although goods from South Korea and Japan are nice. India and Africa can be low-cost manufacturing hubs for Europe and those are much easier routes to secure. Technology, electrification, and reduced dependence on fossil fuels are in Europe’s interests, along with securing energy arrangements with Africa and the Middle East. Europe doesn’t need eleven nuclear aircraft carriers to deal with Russia. Nor do they need to land forces anywhere in the world within a few hours of getting the word. They need to deal with one threat that has a fraction of their population and a pathetic economy. If Russia did not have nuclear weapons, it wouldn’t be considered a major power.

What most people don’t understand is when you buy a weapon, like a missile or a plane, it needs constant servicing and updates. A missile might need software updates to deal with new counter-measures. The F-35 needs software updates for each mission. It is impossible for any EU country to maintain their F-35s without support from US contractors, manufacturers, and the US government that controls them. What if Russia invades Estonia and the US decides they don’t want to get involved, so they say Europe can’t use the F-35 to fight Russia? It’s not likely, but it’s possible. In part because Russia may not directly attack Estonia, but rather foment insurrection among a portion of the Russian speaking minority and send in “little green men.” Would Trump just say “it’s an internal Estonian matter” and refuse to abide by Article 5? And would certainly not extend the nuclear umbrella to cover an “internal matter.”

If Europeans are hoping other pro-NATO Republicans would step in and stop any serious break in the relationship, they are taking a gamble that hasn’t paid off so far. When confronted about Trump, the first thing the Republicans do is ask to see the proof, as “they haven’t read it.” When you show them the proof of statements made by senior officials and policy documents, they say it’s not serious and look at what the administration does. When you point to actions by the administration, they find some other excuse. That frog has been boiled. It is now Trump soup. And even if the mid-term elections sweep in majorities of Democrats in the House and Senate, there is no guarantee they are going to be worried about Europe. In fact, some of those who get elected will have a “not our problem” approach to foreign policy. Because their electorate doesn’t view it as their problem.

The only real choice is to develop home-grown infrastructure and capabilities they can rely on without participation by the United States. Look at this period as a chance at a transition. The alliance allows countries to specialize, and the US provided a lot of the intelligence, communications, and control infrastructure. And, most importantly, a nuclear umbrella. Europe is going to have to mitigate its loss by developing their own capabilities. This means pushing a European satellite launch program and reusable rocket program (to keep costs manageable). It’s going to mean more nuclear weapons and delivery systems. It’s going to mean replacing US infrastructure, knowing that it could be denied to them, or worse, weaponized against them. It will also mean conducting more aggressive and intelligence and influence operations to help shape US opinion and deal with Russian and US disinformation.

On its best days, Europe is like a super-tanker. It’s slow to turn, but once it has a direction it’s impossible to stop. On it’s worst days, it’s a super-tanker with a stuck rudder. But it has some advantages that the US does not. In Ukraine it has a modern warfare laboratory to develop new weapons and tactics. To take a look at the NATO standard tactics that aren’t working and refine those tactics. It’s a chance to develop weapons for what future combat might look like, and to counter newer Russian weapons. Maybe it’s a dark forest of lurking drones and anti-drones. It also allows space for home-grown replacements to US systems to be vetted and refined. It’s horrible to think of Ukraine as a testing ground, but Ukraine needs more weapons and they need more imaginative to counter the ones Russia is firing at them. And Europe needs to quickly build capabilities.

What I don’t think a lot of Americans appreciate is that US companies they invest in, have in their 401(k), and work for, sell to Europe. Europe won’t just be replacing a few F-35s. It will be replacing Master Card and Visa as payment processors. It will need to replace Meta, X, and YouTube for for social networks. And it will need to replace Amazon, Microsoft, and Google as infrastructure providers. It will need an independent industry to provide semi-conductors and equipment so that a mercurial President can’t suddenly demand those exports are halted. (And a lick-spittle congress does nothing). It will mean moving away from US dollars as a reserve, thereby driving down the US dollar long-term. The US has been the incredible beneficiary of a close alliance with Europe, but they took the benefits for granted.

The problem of coalition maintenance is on full display when Europe has to make tough decisions. There is no such thing as a European. There are German, French, Dutch, Italians, Spaniards, and so on. There are no Europeans. Each leader of, sometimes fragile, domestic electoral coalitions has to walk a tight-rope between international, European-wide, domestic, and even regional issues. I don’t say this with any derision at all. These are people who practice state craft at a level American politicians can’t seem to muster. And Chinese and Russian politicians, such as they exist, will practice only in the most vague and muted sense. For example, Russia primarily using non-Russian minorities as fodder in Ukraine, to prevent unrest in the Russian population.

In a crisis, like columns of Soviet and their allied armor crossing through Poland and headed to Germany, the US would effectively short-cut the decision making and command the response. The US could also impose standards on systems to avoid the problem of ten different versions or calibers of the same piece of gear. It was a practical standardization supported by America’s ability to design and produce products at a scale larger than even a collection of countries. Especially in the 1950’s through the 1980s. But, at least during the cold war, there weren’t member countries actively working with the Soviet Union (although France was more than a thorn in the side). Hungary is almost Russian aligned. Turkey is more than soft on Russia – but they seem to ultimately prefer the prosperity Europe has to offer. But good state craft has either muted or side-lined Turkey, Hungary, or Slovakia’s ability to be a problem for NATO.

At this point I can’t imagine a NATO member who isn’t thinking about what they need to do to mitigate the absence of US leadership. I’m sure many are also trying to understand how they deal with a US threat. Without America, NATO will lose the third party that effectively deflects and absorbs domestic fallout from unpopular decisions, such as the 1980s IRBM deployments. In the next twenty-four hours, there is no substitute for the US forces stationed in Europe. But their reliability is now questionable to a degree it was not six months ago. By 2030 or 2035, an increasing portion of those US troops, aviators, and seamen need to be replaced by Europeans. Whether you see the fiscal situation of the US as unsustainable, the state failing as paramilitaries start ethnic cleansing in US cities, or an electorate tired of overseas commitments, US participation is no longer guaranteed. What is guaranteed is a Russia that wants to re-absorb portions of Europe, destabilize the rest, and is a client state of the trading partner that could offset the negative impact of US tariffs (China).

There is some good news. Currently, the EU plus the UK is a larger economy than Russia plus China. China not only has a worse form of the same demographic problem plaguing Europe, but dictatorships are inherently unstable. The inability to flow information in China is not a strength. It is a weakness. Russia doesn’t require large, blue water navies to manage. Europe has a safe lake separating it from Africa and the near east. Europe has a highly educated population. The US is currently destroying its appeal to foreign researchers and graduate students, opening a door for Europe to reverse the brain drain. Much of Europe has a more sustainable fiscal policy than the United States and the Euro is also on track to be the next major reserve currency. Not because of great European decision making, but because the relief valve from American deficit spending is likely to devalue the currency and inflate away the problem.¹ There is not enough Swiss Franc and Gold to support international trade. China has an opaque and highly interventionist approach to the Yuan. And crypto currencies are useless because their volatility means the value of your goods can change 5% or more in one trading day.

I know Peter Zeihan has dim opinions on Europe, with other regions as more attractive, such as the Texas-Mexico border region. But even good demographics, an ample supply of energy, and plenty of other resources are useless if you cannot create a stable country or educate your population. If Europe can mange the collective decision process, or figure out how to turn it into a strength, Europe may be more than okay. For example, the Texas-Mexico manufacturing story may be mute if North American political upheaval combined with Mexican drug warlords results in chaos. With three to four times the population and more than 10 times the GDP as Russia, Europe can afford the capabilities needed to counter Russia. Trade can be managed across the Mediterranean and down the African coast with only coastal navies, or through the Suez. If trade with China were to fall off due to contested sea lanes, there is still India and parts of Europe to fill the gap. This does not mean Europe will be a major power projecting force to every corner of the globe. But it will be far from dire straits.

1. The US debt is 125% of GDP while the EU is around 85%. But more importantly, the US is showing little restraint in going higher. ↩︎

Different European states want different things out of the US relationship. The Baltic states need to avoid a losing game of attrition with Russia, likely starting with an invasion of little green men. (I can’t imagine a direct invasion like Russia tried in Ukraine). Italy likely wants to sell stuff to America. The UK needs both defense help and is probably still fantasizing about some trade deal. Germany needs the export market. It may be easy to agree on the idea Europe should respond as a general principle. But the large coalition makes choosing a specific action hard, as the retaliation could come in a way that hurts one member much more than the other. A collapse of NATO, which I suspect may be inevitable, would hurt the Baltic states more directly than, say, Spain. While a tariff war would hurt Italy and Germany at a time when their economies are struggling.

More trade with China might make some countries happier, but would be a threat to the German industrial base. And, frankly, if Europe wants to have security, they need an industrial base. In fact, they need both a low tech base for shells and artillery tubes, and a high-tech base for drone and counter-drone operations. They are sensitive to energy demand, but pushing South to Africa may mean getting involved in stabilizing their trading partners. That would require them to build the military capability to project strength down to Africa. This might be culturally difficult for some countries, although some compromises are easy when shivering in the cold is your other option. I could imagine Italy, France, and Spain working to secure energy supplies from Africa, but I can’t imagine the average UK or Finnish voter wanting to do the same. And they would have to compete with China and Russia. Maybe as part of a broader trade deal, a push to establish a military presence to the South might have some appeal.

Europe’s numbers are not great from a demographic standpoint. From a GDP and population standpoint, they compare favorably with the US. They have about 120,000,000 more people than the US. They have good technical skills and educated populations. They could offset the demographic issue with automation. However, the US holds a lot of the technology cards. But upending trade deals around IP law, such as weakening patent protections or allowing companies to reverse engineer products, could backfire for some countries, particularly the Nordics. But there might be an area of broad compromise, if they tax digital services that are largely provided by the US, such as on-line advertising. Depending on the company they make between a quarter and a third of their revenue from Europe. This could be billions of tax dollars in short order. But despite the valiant efforts of Schleswig-Holstein, it’s unlikely they could do away with Microsoft, Google, and AWS, entirely.

One thing that is certain, it is unlikely they can defeat the US in an armed conflict. For one thing, they spend just over half of what the US does on defense. For another, they depend on US weapon systems that can be deactivated by the US. This has been a great deal for US defense contractors. And future business for those contractors could be a point of leverage. The US also provides and manages a lot of the space based assets for NATO, along with intelligence. The EU does not have the infrastructure to fill that capability gap. In fact, the US is key to command and control. The EU has a much better arctic capability, but the US can just overwhelm with numbers and technology. In addition the size of the US surface and submarine fleet would deny Europe access to Greenland.

The one thing Sweden, Germany, and Poland could do is to develop a nuclear capability. But a nuclear capability is more than just making bombs. The actual bomb itself is well within the capability of Swedish, German, and Polish engineers. And they have economies or a specific need to quickly develop a bomb. Maybe it takes longer with Poland due to their limited budget, but the would be motivated. Next they need a delivery vehicle, which would likely be a cruise missile or IRBM. Submarine launched missiles would take a while longer. The UK, although it does have nuclear warheads, they travel on US missiles. That would need to change to have a complete solution. And for a second-strike capability, submarines are a better fit. Of course, like many projects, it depends on the focus and execution by the member country. If they start by hiring a company to write the request to set up an office to manage the project to design the 50 year plan for a nuclear deterrent, in order to set the parameters for a European nuclear policy, they’ll fail. They need to skunk-work it through, quickly, quietly, and in a way that denies Russia the ability to use nuclear extortion to stop the project.

Depending on the escalation, it’s not that the US is invulnerable. Although the majority of American debt is held by Americans, the Europeans hold much more of the debt than China. They don’t have to set much of it alight to cause problems for the US. It’s likely they have a carrot here, as well as a stick. Without willing buyers at the long end of the yield curve, US interest rates will struggle to drop. Long term rates are actually rising even though rate cuts are likely (something of which I am painfully aware). Europe can offer to purchase an additional tranche of US debt with maturities in the 20-30 year time-frame. And if the US attempts to backslide, they can quickly stop their purchases. It would push down long term rates, as the supply of long bonds is a little constrained. The paper issued by the treasury for the last few years has been in the short end of the market. The US is not a default risk (although there are some people in the US who think that’s a possible policy). It is an interest rate and inflation risk, with inflation and currency devaluation being the fastest way out of its high debt levels.

It’s not that there aren’t a lot of solutions. Some better than others. And the Europeans have been good negotiators. Access to the US market has been the major carrot the US trade negotiator has used with Europe. But the existing tariffs, and constant threats of additional tariffs, have soured the taste of that carrot. The difficulty is finding something the member countries (including some that lean toward Trump) can agree upon. I’m sure some Europeans imagine that once the mid-term elections happen, Trump will be checked. That he has, at most, another year of being able to act before the next Congress takes their oaths. But let’s say the Democrats who win also have a populist streak, or the Republicans are able to rally and hold the Senate. The ability of Democrats to “stop Trump” would be muted. And a future election could bring another edition of an anti-European, populist leader. I would look at Trump as evidence of the sentiment lurking in parts of the US toward the rest of the world. And that in the face of a “might makes right” bully, having the moral high-ground is not as good as being able to lay out the bully. That needn’t be militarily. But the reliance on the US, especially for technology, can’t be a continued modus operendi for Europe. But the status quo is a lot easier than a new direction, when so many different voices have the power to say ‘no.’